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Non-technical summary  
Unemployment rates are significantly different across regions in Belgium. In the search 
for an explanation for this fact, we simultaneously estimate a wage and labor 
productivity equations where we include regional dummies as explanatory variables. We 
find that the wage-productivity gap reached 11% for Brussels and 4.2% for Wallonia in 
the years 2005-2012. This was driven by the negative performance in labor productivity 
of the firms in these regions relative to Flanders, which more than compensated for the 
advantage in unit labor costs they could profit from. On the other hand, the gap for 
Brussels is found to be currently decreasing in time thanks to a positive growth rate in 
labor productivity. The sign and magnitude of the wage-productivity gap is robust to 
the estimation of the relationship using hours worked instead of employees, and 
including benefits to salaries into the cost of labor.  
These results are coherent with the existence at the regional level of institutional 
barriers to the firm-level adjustment of wages to labor productivity. Among the possible 
explanations for this, our estimations suggest that a reduction in the gap between labor 
costs and productivity  may be achieved through greater wage flexibility at the regional 
level.  
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Introduction  
 
Classic economic theory applied to the labor market assumes that markets are 
perfectly informed and able to allocate workers in open vacancies in equilibrium. These 
workers are paid a salary equal to their marginal product of labor, since labor supply 
and demand are both satisfied. In the real world, however, this condition might not 
hold, as there exist many market frictions triggered by imperfect information and 
institutional factors, such as employment protection, unemployment benefits, collective 
bargaining, minimum wages and taxation.  The persistently high unemployment rates 
plaguing the Western World, and Europe in particular in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession suggest that wage rigidity combined with falling productivity may be an 
important channel causing increasing unemployment. Belgium is no exception, with 
7.6% national unemployment rate in 2012 averaging over the 17.4% unemployment 
rate of Brussels, the 4.5% rate of Flanders and the 10.0% rate of Wallonia (source: 
Eurostat). 
The current study searches for an economic rationale for these persistent 
differences in unemployment across regions, and it does so by analyzing deviations in 
the evolution of wages and labor productivity for Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. We 
will therefore estimate simultaneously a labor productivity function and a wage 
equation on Belgian firm level data, where we include indicators for the regional 
location of the firm as main explanatory variables. In this way, we also analyze the 
relative competitiveness of  Belgian regions. Labor productivity growth is considered a 
key indicator to assess regional competitiveness, together with the increase in labor 
utilization and cost. These metrics are  fundamental to the determination of the gains in 
living standards of regions over time, therefore they hold a prominent position on the 
policy makers’ agenda at the European level. This ambition can be found in  the EU2020 
agenda, where it stats that Europe needs “a strategy to turn the EU into a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity 
and social cohesion”.  Shortly below it is stated that the aim of the EU2020 strategy “is 
to create conditions for modernizing labor markets with a view to raising employment 
levels and ensuring the sustainability of our social models. This means empowering 
people through the acquisition of new skills to enable our current and future workforce 
to adapt to new conditions and potential career shifts, reduce unemployment and raise 
labor productivity”. 
 Our results present evidence of  stronger deviations between labor productivity 
and wages in Wallonia and Brussels relative to Flanders. While the average labor costs 
of firms in Wallonia and Brussels are lower than in Flanders, the gap between average 
labor costs and labor productivity is even larger.  As a consequence, firms in Wallonia 
or Brussels have a competitive disadvantage compared to Flanders, although the gap 
seems to be narrowing in the last years for Brussels.  
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The study is organized as follows: the first paragraph introduces short evidence 
on the labor market in Belgium and the theoretical framework we will exploit to  
interpret our results. A second paragraph follows commenting on the empirical 
methodology and the literature which proposed it. The third paragraph presents the 
data we exploit, the fourth the results of the econometric analysis. The conclusion 
follows.  
 
The institutional context  
Although unemployment in Belgium seems to be on a decreasing pattern down 
from the 2011 peak, mismatches between vacancies and available workforce have not 
substantially decreased in 2012 compared to 2007: almost half of the long term 
unemployed are still low or medium skilled, while 80% of vacancies search skilled 
workers (Zimmer 2012). This happens despite Belgium being among the highest 
spenders for labor market policies (LMP) in Europe: in 2010 (latest available data, 
source: Eurostat) it invested more than 3.7% of GDP in LMPs , ranking third in Europe 
after Spain and Denmark. It also ranked fourth from the top for expenditure in labor 
market services and sixth for out-of-work income maintenance and support. Such 
malfunctioning of Belgian labor market is also stressed in the OECD 2013 Economic 
Survey for Belgium, which states that “longstanding structural labor market problems 
remain, such as high structural unemployment, low employment rates for younger and 
older workers and for low-skilled and migrants, and large labor market mismatches”. 
 Many have pointed to the role of labor market institutions as fundamental 
contributing factors to unemployment: the OECD 2011 Economic Survey for Belgium, 
for instance, reports that “co-ordinating policies to secure a smoother transition [from 
the crisis labor market equilibrium] is difficult, as the communities are responsible for 
education, the regions for employment and professional training, and the federal 
government for labor legislation, collective agreements and social security”1. The 
results of our estimation point at the existence of a regional component in the 
mismatch between labor cost and productivity in Belgium, which can be at least 
partially explained in the light of differences (or lack thereof) in labor market 
institutions across the regions. 
Average productivity can of course differ across regions: Konings and Torfs 
(2011), for instance, show that agglomeration economies can explain important 
differences in productivity. Since economic activity is more concentrated in Flanders 
than in Wallonia for example, it is likely that agglomeration economies (such as input-
output linkages, knowledge spillovers and labor market pooling) are more important in 
Flanders than in Wallonia, resulting in higher productivity in the former. In order to 
                                                           
1
 Ever since 2011, the competence of the regional governments on labor market policies has been strengthened. 
For instance, regions are now responsible for the interview process which evaluates the unemployed person’s job 
search effort, as well as for the sanctions which may apply as a consequence.   
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match these regional differences in labor productivity, wages should also adjust on a 
regional level to obtain full employment. This is easily explained with the aid of a 
standard labor market equilibrium graph, such as Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Labor supply and demand equilibria with rigid wages for Wallonia and 
Flanders.  
 
Figure 1 models two regional labor market equilibria with common wage setting. If the 
negotiation process yields the same average wage for a given industry () across both 
regions, an asymmetric negative shock in the labor demand hitting one region but not 
the other translates in the creation of unemployment in the region hit by the shock 
( − ). Here Wallonia is depicted as hit by the shock in the light of what happened in 
the Great Recession in recent years. When the region is hit by the economic shock, the 
labor demand curve shifts downwards; return to full employment (equilibrium ′) 
through a decrease in equilibrium wage is impeded by the existence of the nation-wide 
bargained wage rate  for the sector. The labor market reaches the equilibrium with 
unemployment , where labor supply and demand schedule do not meet.  
The graph therefore suggests that fixing a nation- (sector-) wide wage may be 
an important contributing factor in the reported existence of unemployment in Belgium. 
This puts in a regional perspective what the OECD 2013 Economic Survey for Belgium 
highlights, i.e. that “the highly coordinated wage formation process preserves relative 
wage differentials, implying that wages do not reflect emerging differences in relative 
labor demand and thus contribute relatively little to support ongoing reallocation of 
labor”. In the next paragraphs we try to substantiate the existence of regional 
mismatches in labor market in Belgium by estimating the gap between labor 
productivity and unit labor costs.  
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The empirical framework 
 
We approach the analysis of the effectiveness of Belgian regional labor markets 
by estimating a value added per worker function and a wage equation at the firm level; 
the main regressors of interest are dummy variables for the location of the firm in 
Flanders, Wallonia or the Brussels region.  The estimating equations hence read:  
log 	  =  +	
 +  ! + " log#$%&) + '()*& +	+ + , + - 	    (1) 
log !.	  = / +	/
 + / ! + /" log#$%&) + /'()*& +	+ + , + 0 	        (2)	
where the dependent variable of (1) is labor productivity (or value added per employee) 
of firm “i”  in sector “j”  in year “t” , while the dependent variable of (2) is average firm 
wage.  and ! are the dummies for Brussels and Wallonia identifying where the 
firm is located (the dummy for Flanders is correctly removed to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity). Age stands for the period past from the year of firm establishment to 
the reporting year, while Size is a proxy for firm’s size and will be specified in the 
estimation as ; they are both are be important determinants of firms’ performance and 
costs. Finally, specific sectors and specific years may have an impact on both labor 
productivity and unit labor costs: to net out our results from such influence, we include 
industry (φ2) and year (θ4) fixed effects. ε624 and η624 are idiosyncratic errors.   
  
We first estimate equations (1) and (2) with OLS and clustered errors to account 
for firm heterogeneity. This provides us with an intuition of the direction in the 
discrepancy (if any) between labor productivity and unit labor costs due to the regional 
location of firms. Our estimators are unbiased if we assume that the establishment of a 
firm’s in a specific region is exogenous to the firm’s productivity and unit labor costs; in 
other words if firms do not self-select into locating in a specific region due to their 
productivity or unit labor cost. We argue that this assumption may hold in the case for 
the location choice between Flanders and Wallonia or Brussels in light of the existence 
of the linguistic and cultural barriers, as it happens for workers flows. On this respect 
see, for instance, Persyn & Torfs (2012), who found regional borders effects on the 
commuting flows across Belgian regions.  Since there is no variation over time in the 
location of firms across regions, estimating equations (1)-(2) with OLS exploits 
between-firm variation in order to identify productivity and wage premia.  
 
Simple OLS, however, does not permit to explicitly test whether the coefficient of 
the regional dummy is equal between equation (1) and (2), as the two equations are 
estimated on different samples and for different outcome variables. That is why we add 
a third estimating equation, where the dependent variable is the difference of the 
dependent variables in equations (1) and (2): 
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log 	!.	  = 8 +	8
 + 8 ! + 8" log#$%&) + 8'()*& +	+ + , + 9 	       (3)	
What is more, we restrict the sample to the same number of observations across the 
three estimating equations, so that 8 =  − / and 8 =  − / . If 8 and 8  resulted 
significantly equal to zero, the hypothesis of equality of coefficients across value added 
and wage cost equations would be validated. In what follows, we will often refer to the 
dependent variable of model (3) as competitiveness, as it stands for the value added 
produced with one unit of labor costs. This measure is also adopted as a proxy for 
internal competitiveness by the European Commission2. 
 
This methodology for testing the significance of the wage-productivity gap at the 
firm level was  introduced by Van Ours & Stoeldraijer (2011). Since then, several works 
have adopted it: e.g. Cataldi, Kampelmann & Rycx (2011), Garnero & Rycx (2013), and 
Vandenberghe (2013)3. Before the innovative paper by Van Ours & Stoeldraijer (2011), 
the literature did not consider eq(3), but rather analyzed the mismatch between labor 
productivity and wages by jointly estimating the productivity and wage equations, 
either by transforming the data (e.g. the seminal paper by Hellerstein, Neumark & 
Troske (1999)), or by using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), as in Van 
Biesebroeck (2007, 2010). This econometric technique helps in estimating systems of 
two or more equations representing relationships which are linked one with each other, 
i.e. when the errors are correlated across equations in the system (Zellner (1962), 
Fiebig (2001)). By simultaneously estimating the two (or more) equations, SUR 
consistently estimates the errors’ covariance matrix, thus permitting cross-equation 
comparison of coefficients. As a consequence, we also find convenient to estimate (1) – 
(3) with SUR, which yields a Feasible GLS estimator, and test the hypothesis that no 
mismatch is present, i.e.  = / and  = / .  
 
We run the three just mentioned estimation techniques (OLS, OLS on the 
restricted sample, SUR) using different specifications of the outcome variables. In 
particular, the number of full time equivalent employees (n) in equations (1)-(3) is 
substituted by the average number of employees working for the firm, and by the 
number of hours worked by full time equivalent employees. The latter is a common 
feature in the labor economics literature, where hours worked are considered a more 
precise account of the labor input contribution to production. A fourth specification 
includes workers’ benefits and compensations into the wage bill, which can also be 
considered part of labor costs.    
 
                                                           
2
 It corresponds to real unit labor costs. European Competitiveness Report (2009),  European Commission.   
3
 An important difference between the current study and the cited research is the choice of determinants which 
are included in the estimating equations. The quoted papers investigate the impact of workers’ characteristics 
(age, education, gender) or their dispersion on labor productivity and costs, and they do so by exploited firm level 
information on the composition of  the labor force. We do not have access to such information hence a similar 
analysis is precluded.   
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Data & Descriptive Statistics  
 
We work on firm level data obtained from the Bureau Van Dijk product for 
Belgium (Belfirst). The dataset covers the population of Belgian firms and the reporting 
quality is high. We exploit both accounting data (turnover, value added, cost of 
intermediate inputs) and social balance sheet information (number of full, full time 
equivalent and part time employees, wage bill and compensations by category, hours 
worked).  We retrieve data from all operating firms in the years 2005-2012. After some 
cleaning, we are left with 518,758 firm (or 430,544 firms on average per year), 59% of 
which was located in Flanders, 24% in Wallonia and 17% in Brussels (ref. Table 1).   
Table 1 : Size of the sample by region.  
 
  Number of 
firms 
% Number of 
firms 
Number of 
observations 
FL 305,534 58.9 2,020,564 
WA 126,528 24.39 839,687 
BX 86,696 16.71 584,104 
Total 518,758  3,444,355 
Notes: “Number of firms” is to be intended as the number of firms which appear at least once in the 
datasets.    
 
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the sample which will be used to 
estimate our regressions. From a first glance to the data it emerges that Flanders have 
a higher value added per unit of labor cost (our measure of competitiveness) than 
Wallonia and Brussels4. This is due mainly to the better performance of Flanders in 
terms of average labor productivity (i.e. value added per worker), which is coherent 
with previous evidence (Konings & Marcolin 2011)5, despite the high unit labor costs 
(higher than in the other regions).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
4
 We discuss here descriptive statistics in level to ease the interpretation. The estimations, however, will be carried 
out in logarithm. Interpreting descriptive statistics in logarithm is in fact not immediate, hence their omission here.  
5
 The number of observations per year may differ from Table 1 to Table 2 since some of the firms reported in Table 
1 have missing values for some variables of interest. In particular, many firms in the sample do not report any 
employee, while our analysis focuses on firms with at least one employee.  
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Table 2 : Variables of interest, averages over all years (2005-2012).  
(All variables are expressed in ‘000 EUR, except for number of employees).  
 
 
 
The described sample is reported in Figures 2 to 4 as well, where each graph 
displays the trend in either average labor productivity, unit labor costs and their ratio. 
Brussels and Wallonia score worse than Flanders in productivity over all the years in the 
sample, while Brussels unit labor costs are comparable to the Flemish ones. This 
reflects in a striking negative performance of Brussels relative to the other regions in 
the sample (ref. Figure 4). On the other hand, in the latest years the trends in labor 
productivity seem to suggest a slowing down in the rate of growth for Flanders, thus 
count mean sd min max 
Flanders Value added 259532 1117.04 10660.60 0 1664001 
Wage bill 259532 681.50 5567.46 1 570587 
Number of employees 259532 14.69 116.66 1 13353 
Labor productivity  259532 81.94 59.56 0 475.29 
Average wage (ulc) 259532 37.75 16.10 0 106.35 
Competitiveness  259532 2.39 1.95 0 17 
Wallonia  Value added 109574 876.74 12927.49 0 2822272 
Wage bill 109574 536.85 4430.72 1 595290 
Number of employees 109574 12.67 84.65 1 11125 
Labor productivity  109574 66.65 49.56 0 475 
Average wage (ulc) 109574 32.47 14.75 0 106.27 
Competitiveness  109574 2.29 1.89 0 17 
Brussels Value added 48426 2658.26 37493.63 0 2766212 
Wage bill 48426 1615.62 21974.47 1 1394097 
Number of employees 48426 32.08 471.72 1 34565 
Labor productivity  48426 71.52 59.67 0 475.38 
Average wage (ulc) 48426 37.13 19.07 0 106.36 
Competitiveness  48426 2.13 1.87 0 17 
Total Value added 417532 1232.73 16667.86 0 2822272 
Wage bill 417532 751.88 8973.54 1 1394097 
Number of employees 417532 16.17 190.22 1 34565 
Labor productivity  417532 76.72 57.53 0 475.38 
Average wage (ulc) 417532 36.30 16.30 0 106.36 
Competitiveness  417532 2.34 1.93 0 17 
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permitting Wallonia and Brussels to catch up with the region in terms of value added 
per unit of labor cost.  We now turn to the econometric analysis to estimate which of 
these descriptive facts are confirmed by a more rigorous assessment of the data.  
 
 
Figures 2, 3, 4: Trends in average outcome variables (2005-2012).  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Analysis  
 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimated regressions where information on full 
time equivalent employees has been exploited. Bx and Wa represent the dummies for 
the location of a firm in the Brussels and Wallonia region, respectively. All results for 
the regional dummies, as a consequence, need to be interpreted in relative terms to 
Flanders. Size2-Size4 are dummies for the size of the firm, respectively for small firms 
(i.e with more than 10 employees and less than 51), medium (more than 50 and less 
than 251) and big (more than 250) firms. The excluded category are then micro firms 
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(10 employees or less), hence all results should be interpreted in relative terms to this 
category6. The dependent variable for each model is specified in the header of the 
columns. Results are presented for the three estimation techniques presented in the 
previous paragraph: OLS with clustered errors, OLS with clustered errors where the 
sample is restricted to have the same number of observations for the three different 
outcome variables, and seemingly unrelated regressions. All estimations include year 
and industry fixed effects, so as to net the coefficients of interest from time trends and 
industry specificities. We therefore implicitly compare firms which have identical 
features except for their location.  
 
The three different econometric specifications yield coherent results7. All 
coefficients are highly significant across the three specifications. The last two rows of 
the table report the signs and magnitudes for the elasticities obtained from the regional 
dummies.  EL(Bx) (resp. EL(Wa)) is the computed elasticity of the outcome variable to 
being located in Brussels (resp. Wallonia) rather than Flanders. Halvorsen & Palmquist 
(1980) proved that these elasticities need to be computed from the estimated 
coefficients according to the following transformation:  
:#;) = &<= − 1 
 
where (?) is the estimated coefficient for the regional dummy ; = {AB; 	DE}. Our 
regressions indicate that, everything else held constant, firms located in Brussels and 
Wallonia rather than Flanders benefit of a discount in unit labor cost of approximately 
5% and 13.5% respectively. On the other hand, they also suffer from a substantial 
disadvantage in labor productivity ranging  from 16% to 17% for Brussels and Wallonia. 
As a consequence, the wage-productivity gap of these regions with respect to Flanders 
is significant and equal to 11% for Brussels and 4.2% for Wallonia for 2005-12, 
conditional on our other controls. This is equivalent to say that the gap between the 
wage and productivity premium associated with firm’s location is almost three time as 
big in Brussels than in Wallonia.  
 
Interpreting the relative magnitude of coefficients of regional dummies across 
different models is possible thanks to the seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner 
(1962)). We hence tested for the equality of the coefficient of the dummy for Brussels 
(resp. Wallonia) across the productivity and wage equations. The null hypothesis is 
always strongly rejected at 1% value8. Standard errors are bootstrapped to take into 
account heterogeneity in the errors.  
 Finally, Table 3 highlights that a 1% increase in the age of the firm improves the 
firm’s ratio of value added to total labor costs by 0.5%. This happens thanks to a 
                                                           
6
 We also ran regressions using the log of size as a control instead of size dummies. Our conclusions are robust to 
this estimation as well.   
7
 The coefficients of OLS(re) and SUR, in particular, are equal by construction, as in both estimations the sample is 
equally restricted. The computed standard errors, however, are different.  
8
 Test statistics and p-values are available upon request. 
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productivity premium to age which exceeds the cost burden of being relatively 
established firms in the market. In other words, the longer a firm has been operating, 
the higher its average wage bill will be (due, for instance, to the presence of internal 
labor markets), but also its productivity. The reverse is true for size: being bigger 
corporations can impose a gap between labor costs and productivity by 24% to 29%, 
depending on the size category9.  
 
We check the validity of our results by estimating the same models as in Eq(1)-
(3) but exploiting a different information set (Table A(I) in the appendix). Columns a1-
a3 are estimated using the firm’s average number of employees rather than the full 
time equivalent number of them, and the average cost of employees. Columns b1-b3 
deflates both value added and total wage bill by the number of hours worked by full 
time equivalent employees rather than the number of employees. Finally, columns c1-
c3 are estimated adding workers’ benefits and compensations to the wage bill, but once 
again using the number of full time equivalent employees to generate unit labor costs 
and labor productivity. To be synthetic, we present here only results obtained from the 
complete sample (OLS) and from SUR on the restricted sample10.  
Results are coherent with the estimation using full time equivalent employees: 
Brussels and Wallonia enjoy a discount in unit labor costs and hourly labor costs with 
respect to Flanders of approximately 5% for Brussels and 12 to 13% for Wallonia, 
conditional on all other firm characteristics we control for. However, the labor 
productivity disadvantage is lower than the cost advantage for the regions, suggesting 
that workers in both regions relative to Flanders are overpaid. The wage-productivity 
gap is hence positive11 and reaches 4 to 7% for Wallonia relative to Flanders, and 11 to 
15% for Brussels.  
 Signs are mostly coherent with previous specifications also for the age and size 
of the firm. An increase in both parameters yields an increase in the average unit labor 
cost for the firm; age, however, also increases labor productivity, contrary to size. 
Consequently, the productivity-wage gap is generally positively affected by an increase 
in firm’s age (except when we run our estimation using worked hours) and negatively 
affected by an increase in firm’s size.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
9
 The exact  magnitude of these gains is inferred from the calculation of elasticities such as in the case of regional 
dummies (not reported).  
10
 Precise comparison of coefficients in models using averages, hours and benefits is not possible, because the 
reported regressions are run over different sample sizes, hence each model estimates separate 
variance/covariance matrixes and standard errors. The same holds for comparison of the columns estimated with 
OLS and SUR. As mentioned in the main body of the text, comparisons of magnitude in coefficients of labor 
productivity, unit labor costs and their ratio are on the contrary possible, for the columns estimated with SUR using 
the same data (e.g. columns 2, 8 and 14).  
11
 The gap is expressed in terms of Productivity over Wages, hence the reverse than the wage-productivity gap..  
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Table 3 : Regressions results for Full Time Equivalent Employees 2005-2012.   
 
  OLS OLS(re) SUR 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
VARIABLES LogULC LogLP LogGAP   LogULC LogLP LogGAP LogULC LogLP LogGAP 
                    
Bx -0.0521*** -0.172*** -0.117*** -0.0518*** -0.168*** -0.117*** -0.0518*** -0.168*** -0.117*** 
(0.00381) (0.00499) (0.00416) (0.00381) (0.00500) (0.00416) (0.00262) (0.00305) (0.00231) 
Wa -0.145*** -0.189*** -0.0431*** -0.145*** -0.188*** -0.0431*** -0.145*** -0.188*** -0.0431*** 
(0.00253) (0.00330) (0.00288) (0.00253) (0.00330) (0.00288) (0.00165) (0.00238) (0.00216) 
Logage 0.0399*** 0.0453*** 0.00509*** 0.0396*** 0.0447*** 0.00509*** 0.0396*** 0.0447*** 0.00509*** 
(0.00112) (0.00148) (0.00131) (0.00112) (0.00148) (0.00131) (0.000943) (0.00128) (0.00120) 
Size2 0.208*** -0.0692*** -0.278*** 0.208*** -0.0702*** -0.278*** 0.208*** -0.0702*** -0.278*** 
(0.00245) (0.00351) (0.00283) (0.00245) (0.00351) (0.00283) (0.00162) (0.00235) (0.00197) 
Size3 0.305*** -0.0182** -0.323*** 0.305*** -0.0177** -0.323*** 0.305*** -0.0177*** -0.323*** 
(0.00482) (0.00708) (0.00521) (0.00480) (0.00706) (0.00521) (0.00308) (0.00391) (0.00346) 
Size4 0.369*** 0.0124 -0.352*** 0.370*** 0.0182 -0.352*** 0.370*** 0.0182 -0.352*** 
(0.0111) (0.0177) (0.0122) (0.0109) (0.0172) (0.0122) (0.00809) (0.0116) (0.00858) 
    
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 410702 414670 410324 410324 410324 410324 410324 410324 410324 
      
EL(Bx) -0.051 -0.158 -0.110 -0.050 -0.155 -0.110 -0.050 -0.155 -0.110 
EL(Wa) -0.135 -0.173 -0.042 -0.135 -0.171 -0.042 -0.135 -0.171 -0.042 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS and OLS(re). Bootstrapped standard erros for SUR. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Dynamics  
 
The picture of relative performance of Belgian regions partially changes when taking 
into considerations the growth rate of labor productivity and unit labor costs. We 
explore this venue to conform to the current policy debate, which seems to prefer 
comparisons across administrative units based on the rate of growth more than on the 
level of competitiveness. Higher productivity growth is indeed generally associated to a 
higher economy-wide growth rate, coherently with a neoclassical model of endogenous 
growth (Lucas(1988), Romer(1994)).   
We therefore estimate equation (1)-(3) again, where the dependent variables 
become the year-on-year change in the logarithm of unit labor costs, labor productivity, 
and their difference. Table 4 shows the results of the estimations for the complete 
sample and for the sample where the same number of observations is exploited for the 
three regressions. In the baseline estimation the wage-productivity gap is reduced by 
the localization of the firm in Brussels but not Wallonia. This  result is driven by the rate 
of productivity growth, which is higher for the former than the latter and higher than 
the coefficient for the cost growth equation, which is then reflected in a positive and 
significant coefficient for the dummy of Brussels but not Wallonia. It remains true, 
however, that being located in either Wallonia or Brussels increases the rate of growth 
of wages the firm is asked to pay to its workers more than a firm located in Flanders. 
The coefficients for age and size of the firm, on the other hand, seem to go in the same 
direction as reported in the estimation in levels: keeping every other firm’s 
characteristics constant, an older or bigger firm displayed a lower yearly rate of growth 
in the ratio of productivity and wages between 2005 and 2012.   
Our results in the preferred specification therefore suggest that a catching up 
process may be happening in Belgium in terms of regional productivity. Being located 
outside Flanders in the sample years guaranteed a greater rate of growth of 
productivity, no matter the cost performance. This translates in a positive coefficient for 
the productivity-wage gap but only for Brussels, while the coefficient for Wallonia is 
insignificant due to the important contribution of unit labor costs.  
The results are rather robust when turning to different measures of the outcome 
variables. In Table A(II)12, the evidence of the full time equivalent specification is 
strongly confirmed with respect to Brussels. As far as Wallonia is concerned, on the 
other hand, the sign of the coefficient for the wage-productivity gap turns from 
insignificant (for the full time equivalent sample, and here when including workers’ 
benefits (column c3)) to negative and significant at 1 or 10% (columns a3 and b3). The 
latter specification, however, reveals that firms located in Wallonia might experience a 
higher growth of labor costs than in Flanders, which may compensate the higher labor 
productivity growth, thus cancelling any significant effect on the rate of change in the 
wage-productivity gap.  Evidence of a trend in the reduction of wage-productivity gap 
for Wallonia relative to Flanders is therefore somewhat mixed, but not for Brussels, 
                                                           
12
 Table A(II) , for simplicity, only reports the results using the restricted sample (OLS(re)). The complete set of 
results is available upon request.  
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where our results portrait  a less negative picture of the region’s relative standing than 
suggested by the estimations in levels.   
 
 
 
Table 4 : Growth Rates for Full Time Equivalent Employees 2005-2012.   
  OLS OLS(re) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
VARIABLES ∆LogULC ∆LogLP ∆LogGAP ∆LogULC ∆LogLP ∆LogGAP 
              
Bx 0.00839*** 0.0283*** 0.0191*** 0.00857*** 0.0277*** 0.0191*** 
(0.00195) (0.00265) (0.00251) (0.00195) (0.00265) (0.00251) 
Wa 0.00989*** 0.00864*** -0.00134 0.00994*** 0.00860*** -0.00134 
(0.00139) (0.00173) (0.00162) (0.00139) (0.00174) (0.00162) 
Logage -0.0106*** -0.0468*** -0.0357*** -0.0105*** -0.0462*** -0.0357*** 
(0.000818) (0.00107) (0.000980) (0.000817) (0.00107) (0.000980) 
Size2 0.0108*** -0.0342*** -0.0447*** 0.0107*** -0.0339*** -0.0447*** 
(0.00110) (0.00155) (0.00142) (0.00110) (0.00156) (0.00142) 
Size3 0.0171*** -0.0289*** -0.0462*** 0.0174*** -0.0288*** -0.0462*** 
(0.00188) (0.00277) (0.00248) (0.00186) (0.00277) (0.00248) 
Size4 0.0167*** -0.0192*** -0.0360*** 0.0168*** -0.0192*** -0.0360*** 
(0.00267) (0.00556) (0.00525) (0.00268) (0.00557) (0.00525) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 228950 231117 228692 228692 228692 228692 
       
EL(Bx) 0.0084 0.0287 0.0193 0.0086 0.0281 0.0193 
EL(Wa) 0.0099 0.0087 -0.0013 0.0100 0.0086 -0.0013 
Notes:  
OLS(re) is the specification where the sample is restricted to the same number of observations per 
each outcome variable (columns (d)-(f)).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusions  
  
 
 This study aimed at assessing whether there existed an equality in wage and 
labor productivity premia for firms in Brussels or Wallonia rather than Flanders. Our 
question stemmed from evidence of academic and policy making nature suggesting that 
regional labor market institutions influence the matching process of workers with 
vacancies. We therefore estimated a value-added-per-worker and a wage equation 
using firm level data for the population of Belgian firms. Our results suggest that even 
controlling for sector effects we still find important regional differences in wages and 
productivity, and that in Wallonia and Brussels wages seem to be “too high” compared 
to labor productivity. This reflects in a positive and significant wage-productivity gap for 
firms in Brussels and Wallonia with respect to Flanders. On the other hand, we see that 
labor productivity fell in 2012 in Flanders more than in Wallonia and Brussels. As a 
consequence the results of the estimation in growth of labor productivity and unit labor 
costs highlight that a process of convergence in productivity may be happening for both 
Brussels and Wallonia, although for Wallonia this is still not enough to reverse the trend 
in the productivity-wage gap.  
Reducing unemployment and hence re-aligning wages with the worker’s marginal 
product of labor requires an intervention on labor market institutions in Belgium. We 
argue that how our results can be interpreted in the light of the existence of collective 
agreements which apply to all firms operating within the same sector across all regions 
in Belgium. One possible field for action would therefore be represented by the wage 
bargaining process, which could be reformed towards a greater attention to regional 
specificities in labor productivity.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A(I) : Robustness Checks for outcome variables in levels 2005-2012.   
 
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS. Bootstrapped standard erros for SUR. 
(avg) implies that the estimations use information for the “average” employee.  
(hour) implies that the estimations use hours worked instead of number of employees. 
(benefits) implies that the estimations include worker’s benefits in the labor cost. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) (OLS) (SUR) 
LogULC LogULC LogULC LogULC LogULC LogULC LogLP LogLP LogLP LogLP LogLP LogLP LogGAP LogGAP LogGAP LogGAP LogGAP LogGAP
Bx -0.0426*** -0.0421*** -0.0460*** -0.0459*** -0.0518*** -0.0514*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.217*** -0.210*** -0.172*** -0.168*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.117*** -0.117***
(0.00384) (0.00287) (0.00336) (0.00235) (0.00381) (0.00253) (0.00501) (0.00309) (0.00606) (0.00386) (0.00499) (0.00315) (0.00417) (0.00249) (0.00554) (0.00397) (0.00416) (0.00282)
Wa -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.0563*** -0.0563*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** -0.0432*** -0.0432***
(0.00258) (0.00180) (0.00221) (0.00136) (0.00253) (0.00174) (0.00332) (0.00219) (0.00414) (0.00269) (0.00330) (0.00234) (0.00291) (0.00173) (0.00399) (0.00258) (0.00288) (0.00189)
Logage 0.0414*** 0.0410*** 0.0398*** 0.0397*** 0.0400*** 0.0397*** 0.0459*** 0.0459*** 0.0208*** 0.0230*** 0.0453*** 0.0447*** 0.00491*** 0.00491*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** 0.00503*** 0.00503***
(0.00113) (0.000882) (0.000922) (0.000674) (0.00112) (0.000865) (0.00150) (0.00105) (0.00182) (0.00122) (0.00148) (0.00123) (0.00133) (0.000950) (0.00174) (0.00119) (0.00131) (0.00106)
Size2 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.209*** 0.209*** -0.0649*** -0.0656*** -0.247*** -0.233*** -0.0692*** -0.0702*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.439*** -0.439*** -0.279*** -0.279***
(0.00248) (0.00149) (0.00213) (0.00147) (0.00246) (0.00174) (0.00351) (0.00242) (0.00377) (0.00253) (0.00351) (0.00240) (0.00281) (0.00179) (0.00338) (0.00203) (0.00283) (0.00181)
Size3 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 0.309*** 0.309*** -0.0142** -0.0146*** -0.169*** -0.157*** -0.0182** -0.0177*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.476*** -0.476*** -0.326*** -0.326***
(0.00493) (0.00286) (0.00434) (0.00243) (0.00484) (0.00318) (0.00706) (0.00400) (0.00728) (0.00452) (0.00708) (0.00362) (0.00518) (0.00275) (0.00596) (0.00361) (0.00521) (0.00315)
Size4 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.416*** 0.415*** 0.375*** 0.377*** 0.0347** 0.0340*** -0.105*** -0.0921*** 0.0124 0.0182* -0.340*** -0.340*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.358*** -0.358***
(0.0111) (0.00602) (0.00929) (0.00537) (0.0111) (0.00723) (0.0164) (0.00911) (0.0179) (0.0111) (0.0177) (0.00987) (0.0114) (0.00706) (0.0143) (0.00858) (0.0121) (0.00698)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 430181 429761 410703 489658 490557 410325 430084 429761 497986 489658 414670 410325 429761 429761 489658 489658 410325 410325
EL(Bx) -0.0417 -0.0412 -0.0450 -0.0449 -0.0505 -0.0501 -0.1617 -0.1617 -0.1949 -0.1893 -0.1578 -0.1550 -0.1257 -0.1257 -0.1512 -0.1512 -0.1104 -0.1104
EL(Wa) -0.1276 -0.1273 -0.1187 -0.1185 -0.1347 -0.1345 -0.1752 -0.1751 -0.1849 -0.1835 -0.1724 -0.1711 -0.0548 -0.0548 -0.0738 -0.0738 -0.0423 -0.0423
(hour) (benefits)
(b2) (c2) (a3) (b3) (c3)
(benefits) (avg) (hour) (benefits) (avg)(avg)
(a1) (b1)
(hour)
(c1) (a2)
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Table A(II):  Robustness Checks for Growth Rates of Outcome Variables (2005-2012) 
 
  (a1) (b1) (c1) (a2) (b2) (c2) (a3) (b3) (c3) 
(avg) (hour) (benefits) (avg) (hour) (benefits) (avg) (hour) (benefits) 
VARIABLES ∆LogULC ∆LogULC ∆LogULC ∆LogLP ∆LogLP ∆LogLP ∆LogGAP ∆LogGAP ∆LogGAP 
                    
Bx 0.00684*** 0.00351* 0.00875*** 0.0120*** 0.0195*** 0.0277*** 0.00519** 0.0160*** 0.0189*** 
(0.00195) (0.00201) (0.00196) (0.00262) (0.00371) (0.00265) (0.00243) (0.00341) (0.00252) 
Wa 0.00801*** 0.0103*** 0.00997*** 0.00349** 0.00592** 0.00860*** -0.00452*** -0.00434* -0.00137 
(0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00172) (0.00245) (0.00174) (0.00160) (0.00224) (0.00162) 
 Logage -0.0127*** 0.00399*** -0.0105*** -0.0450*** 0.0112*** -0.0462*** -0.0323*** 0.00724*** -0.0357*** 
(0.000839) (0.000828) (0.000818) (0.00108) (0.00156) (0.00107) (0.000987) (0.00142) (0.000980) 
Size2 0.00989*** -0.0181*** 0.0110*** -0.0267*** -0.0301*** -0.0339*** -0.0366*** -0.0119*** -0.0450*** 
(0.00110) (0.00121) (0.00110) (0.00155) (0.00193) (0.00156) (0.00138) (0.00169) (0.00143) 
Size3 0.0169*** -0.0250*** 0.0177*** -0.0205*** -0.0479*** -0.0288*** -0.0373*** -0.0229*** -0.0465*** 
(0.00172) (0.00210) (0.00187) (0.00271) (0.00321) (0.00277) (0.00245) (0.00269) (0.00248) 
Size4 0.0158*** -0.0251*** 0.0176*** -0.0149*** -0.0432*** -0.0192*** -0.0306*** -0.0181*** -0.0368*** 
(0.00440) (0.00215) (0.00265) (0.00550) (0.00560) (0.00557) (0.00402) (0.00546) (0.00525) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 244884 289586 228693 244884 289586 228693 244884 289586 228693 
EL(Bx) 0.0069 0.0035 0.0088 0.0121 0.0197 0.0281 0.0052 0.0161 0.0191 
EL(Wa) 0.0080 0.0103 0.0100 0.0035 0.0059 0.0086 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0014 
Notes : 
All estimations are OLS(re) . 
(avg) implies that the estimations use information for the “average” employee.  
(hour) implies that the estimations use hours worked instead of number of employees. 
(benefits) implies that the estimations include worker’s benefits in the labor cost. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
